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This paper investigates whether language priming activates different 
cultural  identities  and  norms  associated  with the language 
communicated with respect to social preference and risk attitudes. 
Our contribution is on identifying the conditions where there will be 
language priming effects.  We conduct economic games with 
bilingual  subjects  using  Chinese and English as instructions. It is 
found that language priming affects social preference, but only in 
context involving strategic interactions. In social preference games 
involving strategic interactions, e.g., the trust game, subjects in the 
Chinese treatment are more trusting and trustworthy. In individual 
choice  games, such as the dictator game,  there is no  treatment 
difference. Further, we also find that language priming affects risk 
attitudes. Subjects in the Chinese treatment prefer to pick Chinese 
lucky numbers in Mark Six lottery. These findings suggest that the 
effect of language priming is context dependent.      
Keywords:  language, bilingual, biculture, social preference, 
risk attitudes 
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1. Introduction 
Recent  research in social psychology has shown that languages are associated with cultural 
frames (Michael H. Bond, 1983; Michael Ross et al., 2002; David Luna et al., 2008) and that 
communicating in a particular language may increase the cognitive accessibility of norms 
associated with that language (Michael Ross, W. Q. Elaine Xun and Anne E. Wilson, 2002).  
The objective of this paper is to systematically investigate under what conditions there will be 
language priming effect, e.g., individual choice versus strategic interactions in social preference. 
We conduct 10 economics games experiments with subjects who are bilingual in Chinese and 
English. There are two treatments. In the Chinese treatment, subjects receive instructions in 
Chinese while in the English treatment, subjects receive instructions in English.  
Three types of games are conducted, namely individual choice games involving social preference, 
strategic interaction games involving  social preference, and games on risk attitudes.
1
This paper is the first to use economics games to investigate the effects of language priming on 
social preference and risk attitudes. The paper closest to ours is Wong and Hong (2005). They 
display Chinese cultural icons (e.g., a Chinese dragon) or American cultural icons (e.g., a scene 
showing an American football game) to the subjects (university students in Hong Kong) before 
 We 
conjecture  that in social preference games, the treatment difference will be stronger under 
strategic interactions. We hypothesize that language priming induces different expectations on 
the behavior of others only in the strategic games, and these differences in belief will in turn lead 
to differences in choices.  The reason behind our conjecture is that under strategic interactions, 
such as the trust game (Joyce Berg et al., 1995), the players need to think more about who are 
they interacting with and what will be the response of the other player. While in individual 
choice context such as the dictator game (Daniel Kahneman et al., 1986), there are no such 
strategic considerations. To test this hypothesis, we collect data on subjects beliefs about what 
will others choose in the games. 
                                                             
1 In each social preference games, two players are randomly and anomalously matched. In individual choice games 
involving social preference, only one player in the matched pair makes the choice.  In strategic interaction games, 
both players make choices. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0612 
 
they play the game.
2
In another study, Briley et al. (2005) find that manipulating the languages will induce bilingual 
subjects in Hong Kong to choose between different product options.
  They find that subjects who are exposed to Chinese cultural icons are more 
likely to choose a cooperative strategy in the prisoners’ dilemma game when they play with 
friends (group-mates in a class project); with strangers this never happen.  
3
Another contribution of this paper is on the methodological side. It calls into attention on the 
robustness  from  experiments  conducted  in English  while some  subjects  are  from different 
nationalities/cultures, e.g., Chinese. This will be especially relevant for studies focused on cross 
cultural differences, e.g., on social norms.  
 A similar effect of cultural 
priming has been found in other studies which use different bicultural subject pools, for example 
Dutch-Greek bicultural children (Maykel Verkuyten and Katerina Pouliasi, 2002), namely on 
attitudes such as family integrity and obedience, and with  bilingual and bicultural Hispanic 
women  (David Luna, Torsten Ringberg and Laura A. Peracchio, 2008) on concepts such as self-
sufficiency and other dependence. However, all of these studies use questionnaires instead of 
incentivized experiments. More importantly,  the present study uses  economics games  which 
cover a range of social preference and risk attitudes which have not been investigated by these 
studies. 
 
Our main findings are: (1) In social preference games involving strategic interactions, e.g., the 
trust game, subjects in the Chinese treatment are more trusting and trustworthy than  in  the 
English treatment. Consistent with our hypothesis, (2) in individual choice games about social 
preference, such as the dictator game, there is no treatment difference. In sum, the effect of 
language priming on social preference is stronger in strategic interactions than individual choice. 
Moreover, there are significant treatments differences on subjects’ beliefs on the decisions of 
others in the strategic interaction games, but not in individual choice games. This supports our 
hypothesis that language priming induces different expectations on others only in the strategic 
                                                             
2 See Shrum et al. (1998) for an introduction to the methodology of priming and its application in investigating the 
effects of television consumption on social perceptions.  
3 In their experiment, subjects were asked to choose between three product options. These options were ranked and 
described along two dimensions of attributes. There were two extreme options (i.e., high in one dimension but low 
in another dimension), and there was one option (called the compromised option in their terminology) which was 
moderate in both dimensions. They found that when Chinese was used, subjects were more likely to choose the 
compromised option.   
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games,  and  these differences  then  lead to different choices  across  treatments.  Further, (3) 
language priming appears to affect risk attitudes as well. In the coin betting game, subjects 
expect others to be more risk taking in the Chinese treatment. In the Mark Six lottery game, 
subjects prefer to pick Chinese lucky numbers only in the Chinese treatment. Overall, these 
findings suggest that the effect of language priming is context dependent.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the experimental design, and 
section 3 reports the experimental results.  We conclude in section 4. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
There are two treatments, the  English treatment and the  Chinese treatment. In the English 
treatment the experiment is conducted in English; in the Chinese treatment it is conducted in 
Chinese. Subjects participate only in one treatment. In each treatment, subjects play 10 games 
(see Table 1 for the list and summary statistics).  
 
We now explain why these 10 games are chosen. In particular, what is the motivation of each 
individual game and how each game tests specific context where other games do not. The games 
about social preference can be broadly classified into two categories: those involving primarily 
individual choice and those involving strategic interactions. For the first category, it includes the 
dictator game (Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler, 1986) and donation to 
charity  (Hong Kong Red Cross)  to measure altruism towards university students and other 
people in the society when it is costly (in a monetary sense) to do so. We also run the jealousy 
game (Gary Charness and Brit Grosskopf, 2001) to measure altruism when it is not costly to do 
so, i.e., quasi-maximin preference (Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin, 2002). The rules of the 
games are described in the experimental results section. 
 
For the second category, we  focused  on measuring trust and trustworthiness  by using the 
simultaneous and sequential prisoners’ dilemma game (Albert W. Tucker, 1950), the trust game 
(Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe, 1995),  the  trust game with reward  and 
punishment, and the public goods game (Paul A. Samuelson, 1954; Peter Bohm, 1972; John O. 
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Ledyard, 1995). In the simultaneous prisoners’ dilemma game, two players are anonymously and 
randomly matched and they make choices simultaneously. However, in the sequential prisoners’ 
dilemma game, players make choices sequentially, and this game will be useful for studying 
trustworthiness of players.  However, in the sequential prisoners’ dilemma game,  the second 
player  cannot  clearly infer the intention  of the first player’s between intention to  trust and 
intention for personal monetary gain even when the first player chooses strategy 2 (see Figure 2, 
panel A). To solve this problem, we design the trust game with reward and punishment in a way 
to allow the second player to be sure that when the first player chooses a trusting strategy (i.e., 
A2, see Figure 1, panel A) his intention is only for helping the second player to obtain a higher 
payoff. Thus, we expect the treatment differences to be highest in this game among others in the 
second category. In the strategic interaction games discussed so far, players are constrained to 
choose between two strategies specified in the instructions. In the trust game (game no. 7), we 
relax this constraint and let the second player chooses the amount to send back rather than 
choosing  between two choices. In the public goods game, we study the impact of language 
priming when more than two players make decisions simultaneously.    
Two different games were conducted to measure risk attitudes. The first was the coin betting 
game, in which subjects needed to choose between receiving a sure payoff or taking a bet on a 
coin flip. In the second game, subjects needed to decide if they wanted to purchase Mark Six 
lottery tickets and pick the numbers for the tickets purchased. These two games allow us to 
compare the risk attitude, where culture-specific preference is less likely to be aroused (the coin 
toss lottery), to the case where it is more likely to play a role (Mark Six lottery). 
 
We now provide  details on how did we conduct the experiment.  In the beginning of the 
experiment, each subject randomly drew a subject number which was only known to herself and 
served identification. Subjects  were handed  a guideline  on rules of the experiment such as 
anonymity of decisions and payment procedure. The guideline was read aloud in Cantonese (in 
the Chinese treatment) and in English (in the English treatment).
4
                                                             
4 Cantonese is a variety of the Chinese language spoken by the majority of the population in Hong Kong, Macau, 
and Guangdong province in Southern China. 
 The instructions can be found 
in the appendix. To check the equivalence of the instructions, the Chinese version has been 
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translated to English, and the English version has been translated to Chinese. It was confirmed 
that the versions are consistent.  
 
Subjects were informed that they would participate in 10 different games, and one of them would 
be randomly drawn to be implemented, and subjects would receive their payments according to 
the results of the game. More importantly, subjects  were told that their decisions would  be 





In the process of running the 10 games, we distributed the instructions of each game (but without 
reading them) and collected the decision sheets of that game before a new game was started. 
After the decision sheets  were  collected, subjects also needed  to fill  in a non-incentivized 
questionnaire which served to elicit their belief about the choices of other participants (except in 
the Mark Six lottery game and the donation game). They were informed that their responses to 
the questions would not influence the amount of money they would receive. All subjects made 
their decisions according to  the same sequence. There was no feedback information on the 
choice of others. At the end of the experiment, each subject also needed to fill in a questionnaire 
which served to collect their demographic information. In games where matching of subjects into 
groups was required, subjects were informed that they would be randomly and anonymously 
matched and that they would not be matched with the same subject more than once. In these 
games we used the strategy method by asking players to specify their decisions under each role; 
their role would be randomly determined if the game was drawn to be implemented. At the end 
of the 10 games, one game was randomly drawn to be implemented, and subjects’ payoffs were 
determined accordingly.    
 
Subjects  were  undergraduate students at  Hong Kong  University of Science and Technology 
(HKUST). They were randomly recruited from a poll of subjects using an e-mail recruitment 
system. The subjects were randomly placed in either treatment. They on average earned HK$91 
(approximately US$11.7), including the show-up fee of HK$50. Each session lasted about 50 
                                                             
5 When handing in their decision sheets, subjects were told to cover them so that they would not be seen by the 
experimenter.    
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minutes. A total of 64 subjects (31 for the Chinese treatment and 33 for the English treatment) 
were recruited.  
Demographic Description 
Being a previous British colony, the population of Hong Kong has had substantial exposure to 
both  Chinese and Western cultures.  For example, both English and Chinese are official 
languages in Hong Kong; they are taught from early on and serve as a medium of instruction in 
the education system. Therefore, our subject pool could be reasonably assumed to be bicultural 




Subjects filled  in a post-experiment  questionnaire, giving  demographic information and 
indicating whether they were bilinguals. We needed to check this because in the recruitment 
process, we did not mention we were looking for bilingual subjects. However, it should be noted 
that before we conduct the experiment, we expect most subjects to be bilinguals who can master 
Chinese and English well as the admitted students (for local students in Hong Kong and students 
from the mainland China which are majority of the students population) of the university need to 
pass advanced public exams on Chinese and English language, and English is the medium of 
instruction for courses in the university.
 8  This is confirmed in the questionnaire. All participants 
– except one – were fluent (speaking and writing) in both Chinese and English.
9
 
 They had started 
learning their language, or languages, from early on: English from the age of 4 and Chinese from 
the age of 2.3. Participants were on average 20.9 years old, and 81 percent of them were born in 
Hong Kong.  
3. Experimental Results  
                                                             
6 However, it should be noted that bilingual does not necessarily imply bicultural even if the norms associated with 
the two languages do not differ much. 
7 For bicultural research using university students in Hong Kong as subjects, see Bond and Yang (1982), Bond 
(1983), Hong et al. (1997), Briley et al. (2000), Hong et al. (2000), Briley and Wyer (2002), Wong and Hong (2005), 
and Briley et al. (2005).   
8 The university is widely considered as one of top universities in Asia. It has been ranked quite high in different 
rankings on universities. For instance, it was ranked top 40 worldwide in the World University Ranking 2010 by QS. 
9 One subject in the English treatment turned out  to be unable to read and write Chinese (as self-reported in the 
post-experiment questionnaire). This observation is not included in the data analysis as we are only interested in 
bilinguals. Hence, the total number of subjects (included for data analysis) in the English treatment is 32.  
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3.1 Social Preference: Strategic Interactions 
Trust Game with Reward and Punishment 
This game has three stages. In stage 1, player A chooses between A1 (i.e., no trust) and A2 (i.e., 
trust) (see Figure 2 Panel A). If player A chooses A2, the game proceeds to stage 2, where player 
B can either choose B1 (i.e., trustworthy), or B2 (i.e., betrayal). In stage 3, player A specifies 
how she would shrink (i.e., punish) or enlarge (i.e., reward) the payoff of player B up to 30 
percent, contingent on B’s choice.  Note that the monetary benefit of betraying exceeds the cost. 
One distinct feature of this design is that player B can clearly infer the intention of player A, in 
the sense that it is impossible for player A to obtain a higher monetary payoff by choosing A2, 
while he may obtain 0 if player B chooses B2.   
Figure 1 presents the percentage of subjects who chose the trust strategy (panel A) and the betray 
strategy (panel B) in the Chinese treatment vs. the English treatment. It shows that subjects are 
more trusting and trustworthy in the Chinese treatment than in the English treatment. About 42 
percent of subjects in the Chinese treatment chose A2, while only 3.13 percent (1 out of 32 
subjects) did so in the English treatment (see Table 1). The difference is significant at 1 percent 
level. Seventy-five percent of subjects betrayed trust in the English treatment, which was higher 
than the 55 percent in the Chinese treatment. The difference is significant at 10 percent level.  
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the marginal effects coefficients from regressing the choice of trust 
or not on the language treatment dummy controlling for expectations on the percentage of player 
B regarding betrayal, age, gender, and whether she was born in Hong Kong. The coefficient of 
the Chinese language dummy estimates the impact of Chinese language on the subject’s choice 
to trust or not. The result shows that when the experiment is conducted in Chinese, the 
probability that player A will choose the trust strategy is  significantly higher. The result is 
significant at the 1 percent level. Interestingly, the expectation on the percentage of other players 
choosing to trust is significantly higher in the Chinese treatment, as shown in the regression 
result reported in column 1 of Table 4.  Players in the Chinese treatment also expect others to be 
less likely to betray, see Table 4 column 2. But the difference is not significant.  
Column 2 of Table 2 presents the regression result for the marginal effects coefficients from 
regressing the choice of betrayal  or not on the language treatment dummy controlling for 
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expectations on the percentage of player B regarding betrayal, age, gender, and whether he was 
born in Hong Kong. The coefficient of the Chinese language dummy estimates the impact of 
Chinese language on the  subject’s choice to betray or not. The coefficient is significantly 
negative (p-value equals 0.02), implying that subjects are less likely to choose the betray strategy 
when the experiment is conducted in Chinese.  
Most subjects (74.2 percent in the Chinese treatment and 75 percent in the English treatment) 
chose to shrink player B’s payoff when their trust was betrayed. Non-trustworthy player B’s 
payoff was on average shrunk by 30 percent in the Chinese treatment, which was higher than the 
27.5 percent in the English treatment, and the difference is significant with p = 0.08 (one-tailed). 
Most subjects (70 percent in the Chinese treatment and 71.8 percent in the English treatment) 
also chose to reward player B when their trust was  not betrayed. Subjects in the Chinese 
treatment chose to increase player B’s payoff by 28.6 percent, which was higher than the 25.96 
percent in the English treatment, and the difference is not significant.  
Regarding the belief on reward and punishment, subjects in the Chinese treatment on average 
believed that 84.9 percent of player A had chosen to shrink player B’s payoff when his trust was 
betrayed, and this percentage was significantly higher than in the English treatment, p = 0.09 
(one-tailed).  
Further, 96.8 percent of subjects in the Chinese treatment believed that player B would expect 
player A to shrink his payoff if he betrayed player A’s trust, which is higher than 78.1 percent in 
the English treatment. The difference is significant with a p-value equal to 0.03.  This is further 
confirmed in the regression reported in Table 4, column 3. Finally, there is no treatment 
difference in terms of degree of punishment expected when B2 is chosen, i.e., about 28 percent 
for both treatments.  
In sum, it appears that players in the Chinese treatment are more trusting because they expect 
others to be more trustworthy. It seems that they are more trustworthy in the Chinese treatment 
because they believe that if they betray others trust, they are more likely to be punished. It also 
suggests that people do not like to be punished, even when the benefits betraying exceeds the 
cost. Overall, it supports our hypothesis that different languages induce different expectations on 
the behaviors of others. 
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Trust Game and Seq. PD    
Similar to the result observed before, we find that in these two games, subjects are more trusting 
and trustworthy in the Chinese treatment.  
In the trust game, player A can either choose between receiving HK$20 for himself and HK$5 
for player B, or let player B determine the allocation of HK$100 between the two players. If 
player A chooses to let player B decide, it implies he has trust in player B. The amount sent back 
by player B is a measure of his trustworthiness.  
Column 3 of Table 2 presents the marginal effect coefficients from regressing the choice of trust 
or not on the language treatment dummy controlling for expectations of the amount sent by 
player B, risk attitude, age, gender, and whether she was born in Hong Kong. The coefficient of 
the Chinese language dummy is significantly positive at the 5 percent level, which implies that 
subjects are more likely to choose the trusting option in the Chinese treatment.  
Column 4 of Table 2 presents the regression result obtained from regressing the amount sent by 
player B on the language treatment dummy controlling for expectations of the amount sent by 
other  players B  and other personal characteristics. The coefficient of the Chinese language 
dummy is significantly positive at the 5 percent level. This supports the hypothesis that subjects 
are more trustworthy in the Chinese treatment. Regarding the belief of players, it is found that 
players in the Chinese treatment expect a higher percentage of others to choose the trusting 
strategy. The result is significant at the 5 percent level.  
In the Sequential prisoners’ dilemma game (Seq. PD), player A first chose between strategies 1 
and 2, and conditional on the choice of player A, player B chose between strategies 1 and 2 (see 
Panel A, Figure 1). Choosing strategy 1, player A reflects an intention of trust. Player B is not 
trustworthy if he chooses strategy 2 conditional on player A having chosen strategy 1.  
Column  6  of Table 2 presents the regression result obtained from regressing  the choice of 
betrayal or not on the language treatment dummy controlling for expectations of the percentage 
of others having chosen to betray and other personal characteristics. Consistent with the findings 
in the trust game and the trust game with R&D, players are found to be less likely to betray in the 
Chinese treatment.   
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On the other hand, in both treatments, most players B (87. 5 percent in the English treatment and 
90 percent in the Chinese treatment) chose strategy 1 given player A chose strategy 1.  
Sim. PD 
This game is similar to the Seq. PD except that players now move simultaneously. The payoff 
matrix is presented in Panel A, Figure 1. Strategy 1 is generally interpreted as a cooperative 
strategy, while strategy 2 is interpreted as a defect strategy.  
It is found that the  percentage of players choosing the cooperative strategy is 58.06 in the 
Chinese treatment and 37.5 in the English treatment. As expected, the difference in proportion is 
significant with a p-value equal to 0.05 (one-tailed). Further, the regression in Table 4, column 7, 
confirms that players in the Chinese treatment are less likely to defect. The result is significant at 
1 percent level. In addition, we find that players in the Chinese treatment also expect others to be 
less likely to choose the defeat strategy, as shown in Table 4, column 8.  The result is significant 
at 1 percent level.   
Public Goods Game 
In this game, four players are randomly matched to form a group. Each group member is given 
an endowment of HK$50 and then decides how much to contribute. The total contributions will 
be multiplied by 2 and distributed equally to each group member. Contributing zero is the 
dominant strategy if one wishes to maximize personal monetary payoff.   
 
Players in the Chinese treatment on average contributed HK$26.13 which is not significant 
different from HK$27.66 in the English treatment. In addition, there are no treatment differences 
on the beliefs on the amount others contributed. Comparing the results of this game to the Sim. 
PD game, it seems that the language priming effect is less strong when the number of players 
increases.  
3.2 Social Preference: Individual Choices 
Dictator Game 
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In this game, two players are anonymously and randomly matched. The first player, also called 
the dictator, decides on the allocation of HK$100 between himself and the second player.  
The dictator game has been run in many different countries, and a typical finding is that the 
amount offered is about 20 to 30 percent of the total pie (see Camerer (2003) for an extensive 
review).  
It is found that the average amounts sent by dictators in the Chinese and English treatments are 
HK$23.40 and HK$23.03, respectively. There is no significant treatment difference under the 
two sample t-test. Table 3, column 1 reports the regression result, where the amount sent in the 
dictator game is the dependent variable, and independent variables include the language 
treatment dummy, belief on the expected amount sent by other dictators, belief on the amount 
others expected to receive, and personal characteristics including age, gender, and whether the 
subject  was  born in Hong Kong. The coefficient on the language treatment dummy is not 
significant. There is also no significant treatment difference in terms of beliefs on the amount 
sent and the amount others expected to receive (see column 9 in Table 4). 
Donation Game 
This game can be viewed as a dictator game, in which the recipients are benefiters of a charity 
organization, the Hong Kong Red Cross. Each player decides how much of out of HK$80 to 
donate to the Hong Kong Red Cross. The remainder will be kept by the player.  
It is found that the average amount donated is HK$8.61 (10.76 percent) in the Chinese treatment 
and HK$13.62 (17.03 percent) in  the English treatment. There is no significant treatment 
difference under the two sample t-test.  
Jealousy Game 
In this game, the first player decides how much the second player will receive out of HK$100 
while he himself will receive HK$40 for sure. 
Our game is similar to the experiment of Charness and Grosskopf (2001). In their experiment, 
each player chooses how much the other player should receive, in the range of 300 to 1,200 
Spanish Pesetas (the currency of Spain between 1869 and 2002) while his own payoff is held 
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constant at 600 Pesetas. They found that 74 percent of subjects opted for 1,200 Pesetas; the 
average percentage chosen was 87.62. In another experiment with American university students 
by Charness and Rabin (2002),  subjects had to make a binary choice between US$4 or US$7.5 
for the other player while their own payoff was kept constant at US$4. They found that 69 
percent of subjects chose the US$7.5 option.  In another treatment, subjects  had to  choose 
between US$8 for the other player and US$2 for themselves, or both received 0. It was found 
that no subject chose the 0 option.    
It is found that the average amounts chosen in the Chinese and English treatments are HK$79.03 
and HK$80.00, respectively. There is no significant treatment difference under the two sample t-
test. Only four subjects in each treatment chose to let the other receive less than HK$40. We also 
regress the amount chosen on the language treatment dummy, belief on expected amount chosen 
by others,  the  belief on the  amount others expected to receive, and personal characteristics 
including age, gender, and whether the subject was born in Hong Kong (see column 2 in Table 3). 
The coefficient on the language treatment dummy is not significant. There is also no significant 
treatment difference in terms of beliefs on the amount chosen and the amount others expected to 
receive (see column 10 in Table 4).  
3.3 Risk Attitudes 
Mark Six Lottery 
Each subject is endowed with HK$50 and can choose to purchase at most 10 Mark Six lottery 
tickets which cost HK$5 each for a draw scheduled on October 3, 2009. Mark Six is a very 
popular lottery game in Hong Kong. The first prize for the game usually amounts to multi-
millions of Hong Kong dollars. In our experiment, if the subject decides to purchase Mark Six 
tickets, she needs to select 6 numbers out of 1 to 49 for each ticket. Subjects were informed that 
the experimenter  would purchase the Mark Six tickets for them, according to their selected 
numbers, from the Hong Kong Jockey Club (the only official seller of the ticket). 
The Mark Six lottery is useful for investigating if individuals are more likely to follow the norm 
of picking Chinese lucky numbers (8, 18, 28, 38, and 48) in the Chinese treatment than in the 
English treatment. 
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It is found that subjects exhibit a strong preference for picking the Chinese lucky numbers only 
in the Chinese treatment (see Figure 3).
10
The preference for Chinese lucky numbers is one distinct example of risk preference termed 
source preference (Craig R. Fox and Amos Tversky, 1995; Amos Tversky and Craig R. Fox, 
1995; Soo Hong Chew and Jacob S. Sagi, 2008). A player is said to exhibit source preference if 
he has preference over identically distributed sources.  This is distinct from the expected utility 
theory  (J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, 1947)  where  individuals are assumed to be 
indifferent between identically distributed sources.   
 In particular, 16.1 percent of numbers chosen in the 
Chinese treatment are Chinese lucky numbers. Compare this percentage to the null of 10.2 
percent (5 numbers out of 49), which is the implied percentage if the subjects do not exhibit 
preference for particular numbers. The binomial test shows that it is significantly different from 
the null at the 1 percent level.  On the other hand, the percentage of the same set of numbers 
chosen in the English treatment is 9.5 percent, which is not significantly different from the null. 
We also compare the proportion of lucky numbers chosen across treatments, and confirm that the 
proportion is significantly higher in the Chinese treatment, with  a  p-value equal to 0.02. 
Interestingly, subjects purchased significant more lottery tickets in the English treatment. The 
difference is significant at the 5 percent level.   
Coin Toss Lottery 
In this game, subjects choose between a sure payoff of HK$30 and a risky bet on a coin toss 
which earns them HK$80 if tail is tossed and HK$0 if head is tossed. Choosing the sure payoff 
option is considered risk averse because the expected value of the bet, which equals HK$80 
times the probability of winning (assumed to be 0.5), is higher than HK$30. 
It is found that the percentage of subjects choosing the risky bet is similar across treatments, 
namely 68.75 percent in the English treatment and 70.97 percent in the Chinese treatment. There 
is no significant difference. However, the players in the Chinese treatment estimated that 43.39 
percent of other players would choose the safe option which is lower than the 54.58 percent 
observed in the English option. The difference is significant at the 5 percent level. The finding is 
also significant after controlling for personal characteristics (see column 11 in Table 4).  
                                                             
10 Interestingly, Chernoff (1980) finds that in the Massachusetts numbers game in the U.S., where players pick a 
number from 0000 to 99999, numbers containing the digits 8, 0, and 9 were unpopular. 
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In sum, the influence of language priming on risk attitudes appears to be context dependent. 
When the context is likely to evoke culture-specific concepts, such as which numbers to pick in 
the Mark Six lottery, subjects are more likely to pick Chinese lucky numbers in the Chinese 
treatment than in the English treatment. However, when the context does not imply a cultural 
frame explicitly, such as whether to take the coin toss lottery, the impact appears to be weaker. 
4. Conclusion 
Language is an indispensable part of any communication and thinking process. We conducted 10 
economics games with bilingual university subjects in Hong Kong; half the subjects received 
instructions in Chinese and the other half in English. The objective of the experiment is to 
identify conditions where language priming may lead to different behaviors. It is found that 
language priming affects social preference, but only in strategic interactions. In particular, in 
strategic interactions, subjects receiving Chinese instructions are more cooperative, trust more, 
and are more trustworthy than the group that received instructions in English. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, we do not observe treatment differences in individual choice games on social 
preference. We find that there are significant treatments differences on subjects’ beliefs on the 
decisions of others in the strategic interaction games, but not in individual choice games. This 
supports our hypothesis that language priming induces different expectations on others only in 
the strategic games and these differences in expectations then lead to different choices across 
treatments. Finally, we also observe influence of language priming on risk attitudes. In the coin 
betting game, players expect others to be more risk taking in the Chinese treatment. In the Mark 
Six lottery game, subjects exhibit preference for Chinese lucky numbers only in the Chinese 
treatment. 
 
These findings are the first in the literature that identify the effect of language priming using 
economics games. They support the hypothesis that the language communicated increases the 
cognitive accessibility of the norms associated with that  language.  Our contribution is on 
showing that the effect of language priming is, in fact, context dependent.  
 
Increasing numbers  of people in the world can now speak two languages or even more. 
According  to Crystal (1997), two  thirds of the world's children grow up in a bilingual 
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environment, and 235 million people are bilingual in English and one or more other languages. 
With the pace of globalization accelerating, the number of bilinguals or even multilinguals is 
expected to increase. The fact that language will trigger particular social norms may be relevant 
for business practices such as conducting trade, formulating marketing strategy, or managing 
employees between two different cultures. We hope these results will inspire continued work on 
the topic.  
 












Panel A. Game Tree  
 
 
   
Panel B. Mean Percentage of Player A Choosing 
Strategy A2  
       Panel C. Mean Percentage of Player B Choosing  
       Strategy B1  
 
Notes: In panel A, A denotes for player A, and B denotes for player B. Payoffs are presented in the form of (x,y), 




A1  A2 
B  (40, 0) 
  B1  B2 
(0, 80)  (40, 40) 




Simultaneous and Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma Game 
  B Chooses 1  B Chooses 2 
A Chooses 1  A gets HK$40 
B gets HK$40 
A gets HK$0 
B gets HK$70 
A Chooses 2  A gets HK$70 
B gets HK$0 
A gets HK$10 
B gets HK$10 
 




   
Panel B. Mean percentage of Players Choosing Strategy 1 in 
Simultaneous Prisoners’ Dilemma Game. 
Panel C. Mean percentage of Player B Choosing 
Strategy 1 in Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma Game 
Conditioned on Player A has Chosen Strategy 1. 
 




The Influence of Language on Preference for Source of Uncertainty 
 
 
Notes: Chinese lucky numbers include 8, 18, 28, 38, and 48. 
 
 




Games and Summary Statistics 
Notes: Sim. PD and Seq. PD denotes for simultaneous and sequential prisoners’ dilemma game respectively. No. denotes the sequence of the game in the experiment. % denotes the percentage of 
subjects who chose the corresponding decision. The test of difference in game 1,2,10, 6, 7, 9 (no. of tickets purchased) are two sample t-test, and the other tests are two sample test of proportion. a 
denoates one-tailed statistics. #:p-value = 0.118. .*,**,** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed). 
No.  Games  Measuring What?  Decisions  Summary Statistics  Test of Difference 
(English – Chinese) 
        Chinese  English   





  Individual Choice           















  Strategic Interactions            
4  Sim. PD Game  Trust and Reciprocity  % Cooperate  58.06  37.5  -1.63
*a 
5  Seq. PD Game  Trust and Reciprocity  % Trust   41.94  34.38  -0.62 
      % Betray   74.19  87.5  1.34
*a 






7  Trust Game  Trust and Reciprocity  % Trust   67.74  53.1  -1.19
# 





8  Trust Game with Reward 
and Punishment 
Trust and Reciprocity; Reward   
and Punishment  




      % Betray  54.8  75  1.67
* 
  Risk Attitudes            
3  Coin Betting  Risk Attitudes  % Risky Bet  70.97  68.75  -0.19 
9  Mark Six  Risk Attitudes   No. of Tickets Purchased       0.97 
      (1.43) 
       2.5 
       (2.98) 
2.61
** 
      % of Chinese Lucky 
Numbers Chosen 
   16.11         9.54  -2.39
** 
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Table 2 
Determinants of Decision in Trust Game with Reward and Punishment, Trust Game, Seq. PD, and Sim. PD 
  Dependent Variables: 
  Trust Game with Reward 
and Punishment  Trust Game  Seq. PD  Sim. PD 



















**  -0.12  -0.19
*  -0.21
*  -0.01 
(0.11)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (3.86)  (0.14)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.16) 
Belief on % of other 
players chose to betray  
-0.01
***  0.01
***      0.01
***  0.01
***     
(0.002)  (0.003)      (0.004)  (0.005)     
Belief on amount sent 
by other players 
    0.01
**  0.73
***         
    (0.003)  (0.10)         
Belief on % of other 
players chose to defect 
              0.01
*** 
              (0.003) 
Risk Taking      0.22           
    (0.15)           
Born-in-HK  -0.01  0.34
**  -0.02  3.28  0.12  0.08  0.02  -0.18 
(0.097)  (0.11)  (0.20)  (5.14)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.16)  (0.20) 
Age  0.04  -0.14
**  0.10  1.18  -0.08  0.09    -0.03 
(0.04)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (1.70)  (0.06)  (0.04)    (0.07) 
Female  -0.05  0.03  -0.11  -4.17  0.15  0.09  -0.09  -0.15 
(0.08)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (4.13)  (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Constant        -26.18         
      (35.79)         
 R
2 / Pseudo R
2  0.48  0.34  0.19  0.54  0.20  0.55  0.39  0.2 
# of Obs.  63  63  63  63  63  63  63  63 
Notes:  Column 1-3 and 5-8 report the marginal effect of the Probit regression, while column 4 reports the regression based on Ordinary Least Square. Chinese is a dummy which 
equals to 1 if the experiment is conducted in Chinese, and zero if in English. Risk Taking is a dummy which equals to 1 if the subjects chose to take the lottery in the coin toss 
lottery, zero otherwise. Born-in-HK is a dummy which equals to 1 if the subject is born in Hong Kong, zero otherwise. Female is a dummy which equals to 1 if the subject is 
female, zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. *.**, and *** represents significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed).  




Determinants of Decisions in Dictator and Jealousy Game 
  Dependent Variables: 
  Dictator Game  Jealousy Game 
  Amount Gave  Amount Chosen 
  (1)  (2) 
Chinese  -4.08  0.64 
(5.03)  (5.71) 
Belief on amount others 
gave 
0.32
***   
(0.10)   
Belief on amount others 
expect to receive 
0.32
***  0.16 
(0.10)  (0.12) 




  (0.14) 
Born-in-HK  7.88  7.88 
(6.74)  (6.74) 
Age  -0.02  -0.02 
(2.24)  (2.24) 
Female  -1.21  -1.21 
(5.37)  (5.37) 
Constant  4.58  4.58 
(47.68)  (47.68) 
 R
2   0.38  0.53 
# of Obs.  63  63 
Notes: Chinese is a dummy which equals to 1 if the experiment is conducted in Chinese, and zero if in 
English. Born-in-HK is a dummy which equals to 1 if the subject is born in Hong Kong, 0 otherwise. 
Female is a dummy which equals to 1 if the subject is female, zero otherwise. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *.**, and *** represents significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed).  
 




Determinants of Beliefs on Social Preference and Risk Attitudes 
Dependent Variables: Belief on Decisions of Others 
  Trust Game with Reward and 
Punishment 





























  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Chinese  -14.92
*  -3.27  0.19
**  -18.5
**  -5.65  -9.1  -1.61  -18.2
***  2.27  -2.15  -10.99
* 
(7.83)  (7.69)  (0.08)  (9.06)  (5.23)  (7.93)  (5.54)  (7.67)  (6.96)  (6.94)  (5.8) 
Born-in-
HK 
2.31  1.34    2.58  6.77  10.49  -4.03  11.37  10.87  0.91  -5.25 
(10.45)  (10.26)    (12.10)  (6.99)  (10.59)  (7.39)  (10.23)  (9.29)  (9.27)  (7.58) 
Age  -1.07  -5.83
*  0.01  -1.52  1.59  -1.56  -0.84  4.06  1.75  2.95  -0.37 
(3.47)  (3.41)  (0.03)  (4.02)  (2.32)  (3.52)  (2.45)  (3.40)  (-3.08)  (-3.08)  (-2.56) 
Female  8.01  3.95  0.04  9.48  2.9  7.41  0.83  3.81  0.12  -2  -7.8 
(-8.44)  (-8.29)  (0.07)  (-9.77)  (-5.65)  (-8.56)  (-5.97)  (-8.27)  (-7.50)  (-7.49)  (-6.20) 
Constant  95.61  194.19
***    80.33  -10.54  100.32  105.63
***  -25.25  -11.10  1.38  65.71 
(-73.25)  (-71.94)    (-84.81)  (-49.00)  (-74.25)  (-51.82)  (-71.76)  (-65.12)  (-64.70)  (-54.26) 
R
2   0.08  0.06    0.09  0.05  0.05  0.01  0.14  0.04  0.02  0.10 
Pseudo R
2       0.12                 
# of Obs.  63  63  63  63  63  63  63  63  63  63  63 
Notes:  Chinese is a dummy which equals to 1 if the experiment is conducted in Chinese, and zero if in English. Born-in-HK is a dummy which equals to 1 if the 
subject is born in Hong Kong, 0 otherwise. Female is a dummy which equals to 1 if the subject is female, zero otherwise. Column 3 reports the marginal effect of 
the probit regression, all other columns report the result of regressions using Ordinary Least Square. Standard errors are in parentheses. *.**, and *** represents 
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level (two-tailed).  
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Appendix (not for publication): Experimental Instructions for the English Treatment 
Instructions  
 
Welcome to our experimental study on decision-making. You will receive a show-up fee of 




You will be given a subject ID number. Please keep it confidentially. In each game, you will 
write down your subject ID instead of your name. Your decisions will be anonymous and kept 
confidential. Thus, other participants won’t be able to link your decisions with your identity. You 
will be paid in private, using your subject ID, and in cash at the end of the experiment in another 
room where no other participants will be present. 
 
The games 
You will make decisions in 10 different games. In the end of the experiment, we will randomly 
draw one game to implement and pay you according to the result of the game.  
 
In some games, you will be anonymously and randomly paired with one (or more) other 
participant. For games involving pairing, each time (new game) you will be paired with a new 
person(s). More specifically, you won’t be paired with the same person for more than once. 
 
If the game involves more than one person in each group (e.g., player A, player B), we will ask 
you to specify your decision(s) under each role. If the game is drawn to implement, the computer 
will randomly determine your role, and your decisions will be implemented accordingly. 
 
In some games, we will need your help to fill-in a short questionnaire after your decisions in the 
game have been made. Please answer them carefully. Your answers will not influence your final 
payoff. 
 
When you have any questions, please feel free to ask by raising your hand, one of our assistant 
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You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another participant to play the following 
game. In this game, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer will randomly 
determine whether you are player A or player B.  
 
The experimenter has provided HK$100 for allocation between player A and B. Player A has 
been randomly selected to determine the allocation. Player A can choose any amount from zero 
to HK$100 for player B. 
 
We now ask for your decision 
If I am player A, I will allocate HK$______ to player B, and HK$______to myself.   
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                Subject ID: 
Questionnaire 
Now we have two questions for you. Please answer them carefully. Your answer will not 
influence your final payoff. 
 
1.  In your estimation, what is the average amount (out of HK$100) chosen for player B by other 
participants (player A)? 
HK$________ 
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Subject ID: 
Game 2                                                             
 
 
You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another participant to play the following 
game. In this game, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer will randomly 
determine whether you are player A or player B.  
 
In this game, Player B chooses how much player A will get from HK$20 to HK$100. Player B 
receives HK$40 no matter what is his/her decision. 
 
 
                                                                      
 
We now ask for your decision. 
If I am player B, I will choose to let player A to receive HK$___________.   
 
 




Now we have two questions for you. Please answer them carefully. Your answers will not 
influence your final payoff. 
 
1. In your estimation, what is the average amount (from HK$20 to HK$100) chosen for player A 
by other participants (player B)? 
HK$________ 
 
2. How much (from HK$20 to HK$100) do you think other participants (player A) expect to 
receive from this game? 
HK$________ 
 






In this game, you are asked to choose between: 
A.  Receiving HK$30 for sure. 
B.  The experimenter will flip a coin in front of you. If it is tail, you receive HK$80. If it is 
head, you receive HK$0.  
 
We now ask for your decision 
I choose (please circle)    A            B.   
 




Now we have a question for you. Please answer it carefully. Your answer will not influence your 
final payoff. 
 
1. In your estimation, how many percent of other participants have chosen option A (i.e., 










You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another participant to play the following 
game. In this game, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer will randomly 
determine whether you are player A or player B.  
 
In this game, Player A and B makes decision simultaneously, choosing between 1 and 2. The 
payoff is determined by the following table.  
 
  B Chooses 1  B Chooses 2 
A Chooses 1  A gets HK$40 
B gets HK$40 
A gets HK$0 
B gets HK$70 
A Chooses 2  A gets HK$70 
B gets HK$0 
A gets HK$10 
B gets HK$10 
 
If A chooses 1 and B chooses 1, then both players will get HK$40.  
If A chooses 1 and B chooses 2, then A will get HK$0 and B will get HK$70.  
If A chooses 2 and B chooses 1, then A will get HK$70 and B will get HK$0. 
If A chooses 2 and B chooses 2, then both players will get HK$10. 
 
We now ask for your decision 
I will choose (please circle)    1            2.   
 








1. In your estimation, how many percent of other participants have chosen 2? 
________% 
 
  B Chooses 1  B Chooses 2 
A Chooses 1  A gets HK$40 
B gets HK$40 
A gets HK$0 
B gets HK$70 
A Chooses 2  A gets HK$70 
B gets HK$0 
A gets HK$10 
B gets HK$10 
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Subject ID: 
Game 5  
 
You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another participant to play the following 
game. In this game, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer will randomly 
determine whether you are player A or player B.  
 
The game has two stages. Player A and B make decision sequentially, choosing between 1 and 
2. The payoff is determined by the following table.  
 
Stage 1 
In stages 1, player A chooses between 1 or 2.  
 
Stage 2 
In stage 2, player B specifies his choices in the following contingencies. 
 
If player A chooses 1, I will choose (please circle) 1      2. 
If player A chooses 2, I will choose (please circle) 1      2. 
 
  B Chooses 1  B Chooses 2 
A Chooses 1  A gets HK$40 
B gets HK$40 
A gets HK$0 
B gets HK$70 
A Chooses 2  A gets HK$70 
B gets HK$0 
A gets HK$10 
B gets HK$10 
 
If A chooses 1 and B chooses 1, then both players will get HK$40.  
If A chooses 1 and B chooses 2, then A will get HK$0 and B will get HK$70.  
If A chooses 2 and B chooses 1, then A will get HK$70 and B will get HK$0. 
If A chooses 2 and B chooses 2, then both players will get HK$10. 
 
 
We now ask for your decision. 
If you are player A 
If I am player A, I will choose (please circle)     1            2.   
 
If you are player B 
If player A chooses 1, I will choose (please circle) 1            2.   











Now we have two more questions for you. Please answer them carefully. Your answers will not 
influence your final payoff. 
 




2. In your estimation, how many percent of other participants (player B) have chosen “If player 





  B Chooses 1  B Chooses 2 
A Chooses 1  A gets HK$40 
B gets HK$40 
A gets HK$0 
B gets HK$70 
A Chooses 2  A gets HK$70 
B gets HK$0 
A gets HK$10 
B gets HK$10 




Game 6  
In this game, you will be randomly matched with three other players to form a group of four. 
Each of you will be given an endowment of HK$50. Each group member can contribute any 
amount of the endowment. Then the total contributions of the group members will be multiplied 
by 2 and distribute equally to each group member. 
 
Your payoff will be determined by the following formula: 
 
HK$50 – your contribution + 2x(sum of contributions from all group members)/4 
 
We now ask for your decision 
 
I choose to contribute HK$_______.  
 




Now we have one more question for you. Please answer it carefully. Your answers will not 
influence your final payoff. 
 








Game 7  
You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another participant to play the following 
game. In this game, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer will randomly 
determine whether you are player A or player B.  
 
The game has two stages. 
                                                                     A  
 
                                                            X            Y 
 
                                                         A 20         Total 100   
                                                         B  5           




Player A chooses between X and Y. If he chooses X, player A will receive HK$20, player B will 
receive HK$5, and then the game ends. If player A chooses Y, the game proceeds to stage 2. 
 
Stage 2 
There is a sum of HK$100 available for allocation between player A and B. Player B will 
determine how much to allocate to himself/herself and how much to player A. 
 
We now ask for your decision 
If you are player A 
If I am player A, I will choose (please circle)     X            Y.   
 
If you are player B and when Y was chosen player A 
If I am player B, I will allocate HK$______ to player A, and HK$______to myself. 
 
                                                      
 




Now we have two more questions for you. Please answer them carefully. Your answers will not 
influence your final payoff. 
 
1. In your estimation, how many percent of other participants (player A) have chosen X? 
_________% 
 
2. How much do you think, on average, other participants (player B) have chosen to allocate to 
player A when Y was chosen? 
HK$________ 
 
                                                                    A  
 
                                                            X            Y 
 
                                                         A 20         Total 100   
                                                         B  5           
 
 




You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another participant to play the following 
game. In this game, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer will randomly 
determine whether you are player A or player B.  
 
The game has three stages.                A 
                                                    
                                                 A1              A2 
                                                                B 
                                              (40, 0)     
                                                          B1            B2 
 
                                                    (40, 40)         (0, 80) 
 
                                                       Note: (payoff of A, payoff of B) 
 
Stage 1 
Player A chooses between A1 and A2. If player A chooses A1, player B will receive 0, player A 
will receive HK$40, and the game ends. If Player A chooses A2, the game proceeds to stage 2. 
 
Stage 2 
Player B chooses between B1 and B2. If player B chooses B1, both players will receive HK$40. 




Player A has the option to shrink or enlarge player B’s payoff up to 30%.  
 
We now ask for your decision. 
If you are player A 
If I am player A, I will choose (please circle)     A1            A2.   
 
If you are player B 
If I am player B, I will choose (please circle)     B1            B2.   
 
If you are player A and Player B chooses B1 
I will          shrink    enlarge  (please circle)     player B’s payoff by _____%. 
 
If you are player A and Player B chooses B2 













Now we have some questions for you. Please answer them carefully. Your answers will not 
influence your final payoff. 
 
1. In your estimation, how many percent of other participants (player A) have chosen A1? 
________% 
 
2. In your estimation, how many percent of other participants (player B) have chosen B2 given 
player A chose A2? 
________% 
 
3. In your estimation, how many percent of other participants (player A) have chosen to shrink 
player B’s payoff when B2 was chosen? 
________% 
 
4. Do you think player B will expect player A to shrink his/her payoff when B2 was chosen? 
 
Yes           No   (please circle) 
 
If yes, by how many percent? 
_______% 
 
                                                           A 
                                                    
                                                 A1              A2 
                                                                B 
                                              (40, 0)     
                                                          B1            B2 
 
                                                    (40, 40)         (0, 80) 





Do you want to try your luck? 
 
You are now endowed with HK$50 and can spend any part of it to purchase at most 10 mark six 
tickets, each ticket costs HK$5, for the draw scheduled on 3-Oct-2009. If you decide to purchase, 
you will be asked to select 6 numbers out of 1 to 49 for each ticket. We will then purchase the 
tickets for you, according to the numbers selected, and of course, we will inform you if you win! 
 
We now ask for your decision. 
 
How many tickets do you want to purchase? 
I decide to purchase 0  1  2  3  4  5  6   7  8  9  10 tickets (please circle). 
 
Ticket 1 
Choose 6 different numbers from 1 to 49. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
Ticket 2 
Choose 6 different numbers from 1 to 49. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
Ticket 3 
Choose 6 different numbers from 1 to 49. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
Ticket 4 
Choose 6 different numbers from 1 to 49. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
Ticket 5 
Choose 6 different numbers from 1 to 49. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
Ticket 6 
Choose 6 different numbers from 1 to 49. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 














Choose 6 different numbers from 1 to 49. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 




Choose 6 different numbers from 1 to 49. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
Ticket 9 
Choose 6 different numbers from 1 to 49. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
Ticket 10 
Choose 6 different numbers from 1 to 49. 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
 





You are endowed with HK$80. You can choose to donate any amount from HK$0 to HK$80 to 
the Hong Kong Red Cross. You will keep the remaining amount. If you choose to donate any 
amount, we will help you to donate the money to the Hong Kong Red Cross anonymously. 
 
We now ask you to indicate your decision 
I decide to donate HK$________to the Hong Kong Red Cross. 





Now we have more questions for you. Please answer them carefully. Your answers will not 
influence your final payoff. 
 
Q1. Are you born in Hong Kong? 
Yes     No                 
 
Q2. How old are you? 
_______years old 
 
Q3. Can you read and write both English and Chinese? 
Yes     No (I can’t read and write Chinese / English (please circle)) 
 
Q4. When did you start learning English? 
Since_______years old 
 
Q5. When did you start learning Chinese? 
Since_______years old 
 
Q6. How long have you been living in Hong Kong? 
       
A.  Since I was born. 
B.  More than 10 years. 
C.  More than 7 years. 
D.  More than 1 year. 
 
Q7. Do you speak Cantonese? 
Yes     No 
 
Q8. Do you speak Putonghua? 
Yes     No 
 
Q9. Where did you receive your secondary school education? 
A.  Hong Kong 
B.  Mainland China 
C.  U.S or Canada 
D.  U.K 
E.  Others 
 
Q10. What is your gender? 
Male   Female 
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Experimental instructions for the Chinese Treatment 
規則 
 

















如果該遊戲需要進行配對, 每組有兩位或以上參與者(例如, 甲、乙), 我們將要求您根據每
個角色指定您的決定, 換而言之, 您需要指定如果你是甲, 你會做甚麼選擇, 同時, 您也需要

















實驗者提供了港幣 100 元給甲和乙, 甲已被隨機選擇來決定這 100 元如何分配, 甲可以從零
到港幣 100 元中選擇任何金額分配給乙。 
 
你的決策 
如果我是甲, 我會分配港幣______元給乙, 和分配港幣_______元給自己 。 





我們需要你回答兩條問題, 請認真回答, 你的答案並不會影響你在實驗得到金額。 
 
1. 請問你估計其他的參加者(甲)平均從港幣 100 元中分配多少金額給乙? 
港幣_________元 
 
2. 請問你估計其他的參加者(乙)會預期從港幣 100 元中拿到多少金額? 
港幣_________元 
 








在這個遊戲中, 乙需要決定甲可以從港幣 20 元到 港幣 100 元 中拿到多少錢, 無論乙的決定











我們需要你回答兩條問題, 請認真回答, 你的答案並不會影響你在實驗得到金額。 
 
1. 請問你估計其他的參加者(乙)平均選擇讓甲從港幣 20 元 到 港幣 100 元中拿到多少錢? 
港幣_________元 
 
2. 請問你估計其他的參加者(甲)會預期從港幣 20 元 到 港幣 100 元中拿到多少錢? 
港幣_________元 









一.  一定得到港幣 30 元 
二.  實驗者會在你面前拋一個硬幣, 如果是正面, 你會得到港幣 80 元, 如果是反面, 你會
得到港幣 0 元 
 
你的決策 
我會選 (請打圈)    一            二。 
 





我們需要你回答一條問題, 請認真回答, 你的答案並不會影響你在實驗得到金額。 
 
1. 請問你估計百分幾的其他參加者選擇了選項一(一定得到港幣 30 元?) 
百分之________ 















  乙 選 1  乙選 2 
甲選 1  甲得 港幣 40 元 
乙得 港幣 40 元 
甲得港幣 0元 
乙得港幣 70 元 
甲選 2  甲得港幣 70 元 
乙得港幣 0元 
甲得港幣 10 元 
乙得港幣 10 元 
 
如果甲和乙分別選 1, 雙方會各自得到港幣 40 元。 
如果甲選 1, 乙選 2 ,甲會得到港幣 0 元, 乙會得到港幣 70 元。 
如果甲選 2, 乙選 1 ,甲會得到港幣 0 元, 乙會得到港幣 70 元。 























  乙 選 1  乙選 2 
甲選 1  甲得 港幣 40元 
乙得 港幣 40 元 
甲得港幣 0 元 
乙得港幣 70 元 
甲選 2  甲得港幣 70元 
乙得港幣 0元 
甲得港幣 10 元 
乙得港幣 10 元 
 












甲決定選 1 或 2。 
 
步驟 2 
乙決定在以下的情況中選 1 或 2。 
如果甲選 1, 我會選 (請打圈)    1            2。 
如果甲選 2, 我會選 (請打圈)    1            2。 
 
  乙 選 1  乙選 2 
甲選 1  甲得 港幣 40元 
乙得 港幣 40 元 
甲得港幣 0 元 
乙得港幣 70 元 
甲選 2  甲得港幣 70元 
乙得港幣 0元 
甲得港幣 10 元 




如果甲和乙分別選 1, 雙方會各自得到港幣 40 元。 
如果甲選 1, 乙選 2 ,甲會得到港幣 0 元, 乙會得到港幣 70 元。 
如果甲選 2, 乙選 1 ,甲會得到港幣 0 元, 乙會得到港幣 70 元。 
如果甲和乙分別選 2, 雙方會各自得到港幣 10 元。 
 
 





如果我是甲, 我會選 (請打圈)    1            2。 
 
如果你是乙 
如果甲選 1, 我會選 (請打圈)    1            2。 
如果甲選 2, 我會選 (請打圈)    1            2。 
 
 






我們需要你回答兩條問題, 請認真回答, 你的答案並不會影響你在實驗得到金額。 
 
1. 請問你估計有百分之幾的其他的參加者(甲)選了 2? 
百分之________ 
 




  乙 選 1  乙選 2 
甲選 1  甲得 港幣 40元 
乙得 港幣 40 元 
甲得港幣 0 元 
乙得港幣 70 元 
甲選 2  甲得港幣 70元 
乙得港幣 0元 
甲得港幣 10 元 
乙得港幣 10 元 
 
 




































                                                                    甲 
 
                                                            1             2 
 
                                                         甲 20         總共 100   
                                                         乙 5           
                                                      
步驟 1 
甲決定選 1 或 2。如果甲選 1, 甲會得到港幣 20 元, 乙會得到港幣 5 元, 同時這個遊戲會中
止。如果甲選 2, 遊戲會進入步驟 2。 
 
步驟 2 





如果我是甲, 我會選 (請打圈)    1            2。 
 
如果你是乙 
如果我是乙, 我會分配港幣______元給乙, 和分配港幣_______元給自己 。 





我們需要你回答兩條問題, 請認真回答, 你的答案並不會影響你在實驗得到金額。 
 
1. 請問你估計有百分之幾的其他的參加者(甲)選 1? 
百分之________ 
 




                                                                    甲 
 
                                                            1             2 
 
                                                         甲 20         總共 100   
                                                         乙 5           










                                                             甲 
                                                    
                                                   1               2 
                                                               乙 
                                              (40, 0)     
                                                          3                 4 
 
                                                      (40, 40)              (0, 80) 
 
注: (甲得到的金額 , 乙得到的金額) 
 
步驟 1 
甲決定選 1 或 2。如果甲選 1, 甲會得到港幣 40 元, 乙則得港幣 0 元, 同時本遊戲會終止。
如果甲選 2, 遊戲會進入步驟 2。 
 
步驟 2 
乙決定選 3 或 4。如果乙選 3, 甲乙會分別得到港幣 40 元。如果乙選 4, 乙會得到港幣 80 元, 











如果我是甲, 我會選 (請打圈)    1            2。 
 
如果你是乙 
如果我是乙, 我會選 (請打圈)    3            4。 
 
如果你是甲,同時乙選 3 
我會    減少   增加   (請打圈)      乙的所得金額 百分之________。 
 
如果你是甲,同時乙選 4 
我會    減少   增加   (請打圈)      乙的所得金額 百分之________。 
 






我們需要你回答幾條問題, 請認真回答, 你的答案並不會影響你在實驗得到金額。 
 
1. 請問你估計有百分之幾的其他的參加者(甲)選 1? 
百分之________ 
 




3. 如果乙選 4, 請問你估計有百分之幾的其他的參加者(甲)選擇減少乙的所得金額? 
百分之________ 
 
4. 如果乙選 4, 請問你估計乙會預期甲會減少他/她的所得金額嗎? 







                                                           甲 
                                                    
                                                   1               2 
                                                               乙 
                                              (40, 0)   
                                                          3                 4 
 
                                                    (40, 40)               (0, 80) 
 







你會收到港幣 50 元, 你可以用其中任何金額來買六合彩彩票(最多十張, 每張港幣 5 元, 在
3/10/2009 攪珠)。如果你決定購買, 在每張彩票中你必須從 1 到 49 中選取 6 個號碼, 我們會




我決定買  0  1  2  3  4  5  6   7  8  9  10 張。 
 
第一張 
從 1到 49 中選 6 個號碼 
1    3  4    6   
8  9  10  1  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  5  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
第二張 
從 1到 49 中選 6 個號碼 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
3  37  38  39  40  4  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
第三張 
從 1到 49 中選 6 個號碼 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
3  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
第四張 
從 1到 49 中選 6 個號碼 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  1  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  3  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 










從 1到 49 中選 6 個號碼 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  1  13  14 









從 1到 49 中選 6 個號碼 
1  2  3  4    6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
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22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  8  39  0  41  2 
3  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  0  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
   
 
第七張 
從 1到 49 中選 6 個號碼 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  1  17  18  19  20  2 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  5 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 




從 1到 49 中選 6 個號碼 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  1  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  4 
43  4  45  6  4  48  49 
 
第九張 
從 1到 49 中選 6 個號碼 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8    10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  20  21 
22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  39  40  41  42 
43  44  45  6  47  48  49 
 
第十張 
從 1到 49 中選 6 個號碼 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
15  16  17  18  19  2  21 
2  23  4  2  26  27  28 
29  30  31  32  33  34  35 
36  37  38  3  40  41  42 
43  44  45  46  47  48  49 
 
 
















我們需要你回答幾條問題, 請認真回答, 你的答案並不會影響你在實驗得到金額。 
 
1. 請問你是否在香港出生? 



















2. 超過 10 年 
3. 超過 7年 
4. 超過 1年 
 
7. 請問你會講廣東話嗎? 
會       不會 
 
8.請問你會講普通話嗎? 
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10. 請問你的性別是? 
男        女 
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